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Out of the Garden of Eden:
Moving Beyond the Rights-Based Agenda in the Urban Sector
by Benjamin Bradlow*

Introduction
The cities of the global South are the harbingers of a new
age. For the first time in history, more than half of humanity lives
in cities.1 One billion people live in slums.2 The vast majority of
this billion is living in “informal” arrangements.3 This means
living without legally recognized land tenure, housing, social
relationships, and economic livelihoods.4
Evictions and demolitions spring from this informality.
Recourse to legal protection is difficult for slum dwellers, since
formal actors such as the State can, and often do, exploit this
divide. As land in urban settings becomes scarcer,5 the temptation for both public and private landowners to evict ordinary
poor people increases. Watchdogs and legal assistance organizations have sprung up in multitudes to support slum dwellers
to fight evictions.6 They fight for the rights of slum dwellers to
have adequate shelter, basic services, and other socio-economic
benefits. In countries such as South Africa, where the Constitution contains extensive socio-economic rights, a series of court
cases in the past decade has developed a method of defending
the rights of slum dwellers by focusing on the role of the State.7
The emerging jurisprudence has been geared primarily towards
compelling the State to deliver entitlements.8
But there are real limitations to the uses of socio-economic
rights as a language and framework for development. Does
enshrining the right to housing, water, health, electricity, and
other necessities, assume that the governments bound by these
obligations will suddenly be able to fulfill them? Few would
make such a self-evidently naïve case. Still, especially in the
urban sector, the rights-based framework predominates.9
This paper will make three related arguments. First, legal
and advocacy methods that hold governments accountable with
respect to their socio-economic rights obligations have continuing relevance. But such an approach has limited value in structuring mechanisms by which to actually deliver entitlements.
Secondly, organizations such as Shack / Slum Dwellers International (“SDI”) are developing methodologies that move beyond
a rights-based agenda that reacts to the denial of entitlements, to
implement proactive, sustainable alternative solutions to evictions, and to thereby build the foundations for participatory,
inclusive cities. In fact, the basic legal and institutional framework produced by the rights-based approach has been a prerequisite for opening the space for the alternatives that groups like
SDI work on. Finally, there is common ground among these
approaches that can serve as a basis for increased coherence of
purpose and effort among civil society actors. In practice, this
means supporting people-centered processes to address the large
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problems of urban human settlements worldwide in increasingly
more sustainable and scalable ways.

The Limitations of a Rights-Based Model
The primary limitation of a rights-based agenda is that its
methodology enforces professional control, with special emphasis on that accruing to lawyers and judges. If the struggles against
forced eviction, and for basic services and shelter—the primary
sites of socio-economic contestation in the urban setting—are
to take place in the courts, then lawyers inevitably become the
interlocutors of the poor. This is true regardless of whether the
rights-based agenda is articulated by NGOs, community-based
social movements, or lawyers themselves.
Often lawyers’ involvement is necessary. The work that the
Center for Housing Rights and Evictions (“COHRE”), various
UN agencies, other watchdogs, and legal aid organizations do
is indispensable for keeping governments accountable to their
citizens. It is a humanitarian necessity to defend the poor against
State and private sector attempts to deny rights to housing and
basic services in urban areas. Many of these groups perform key
practical functions such as strategic litigation, advocacy, and
documentation of the ways in which governments throughout
the world exclude the urban poor and perpetrate acts of physical,
social, and economic violence. Housing and land evictions are
all too common in an age where urban human settlements are
clearly the way of the future. Because of the pioneering work
that these groups have done there is space to explore alternatives
to evictions and demolitions.

Shack/Slum Dwellers International:
An Alternative Approach
SDI is an alliance of community-based organizations of the
urban poor in thirty-three countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.10 These groups use methodologies that spring from
the most fundamental aspects of informal life. Accordingly,
all SDI-affiliated federations share a few bedrock practices.
The first is women-led daily savings schemes organized at the
street level, which build financial and social capacity within
communities. Such a savings method allows these communities to engage with formal financial actors such as the State and
banks to leverage further resources for development. Whereas
* Benjamin Bradlow is Research and Documentation Officer for the Secretariat
of Shack / Slum Dwellers International (“SDI”) in Cape Town, South Africa. He
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the savings component of traditional microfinance is geared
generally towards livelihood activities, the social and financial
implications of SDI daily savings are much more political.11
Another activity, known as “enumeration,” is the practice of
community-led information gathering, which builds the capacity
within poor communities to engage with formal actors, often the
State, around planning and policy implementation in slum areas.
This activity is, similarly, about bringing communities together
around information in their own community to achieve political
leverage.12
Social movements cover a wide range of forms and purposes. More traditional social movements, including those
involved in liberation struggles, are fundamentally opposed to
the State. They contest the State in the courts and in the streets.
A liberation or revolution-oriented social movement, aims to
overthrow the State. Other social movements are focused on
resisting dispossession, and therefore mainly pursue challenges
in the courts. These cases tend to demand that the State be the
sole provider of solutions to socio-economic problems. Under
such a framework, people’s movements may be effective tools
for advocacy, but the poor remain passive constituencies waiting
for services to be delivered from above.
SDI-affiliated groups move beyond such passivity. They
seek out partnership with the State; however, this partnership
is not to create pliant constituencies for government programs.
Instead, these poor people’s movements serve to open up the
institutions and resources of the State to participation and control by people themselves. It is a quintessentially bottom-up,
reformist agenda. These people’s movements seek to “co-produce” delivery of services and implementation of socio-economic guarantees with the State.
Such a battle is not just in the streets, but also in the home,
which is of course where it begins. Firstly, SDI federations organize with women at the center. They do this because they find
that women are equipped to manage money, livelihoods, and
family—in short, the home. As Rose Molokoane, a leader of
South Africa’s Federation of the Urban Poor and an SDI coordinator, often says, “WOMEN stands for Well-Organized Men.”13
Secondly, in the communities in which SDI federations operate,
the home’s informality itself is the fundamental challenge to the
status quo. A poor person lives on a piece of land in a city and
needs to find a solution for shelter. The upgrading of informal
settlements and the livelihoods of slum dwellers begins with
people taking action to erect an illegal shack. As SDI federations
increasingly demonstrate, the capacities and methodologies for
upgrading lie in the hands of those who have already begun creating their own solutions.

Alternative Methods in Action:
Examples from Cape Town and Nairobi
Against the threat of eviction and demolitions, communities have organized around their own knowledge capacity to first
face down the threat, and then to create the space for dialogue
with government that leads to the upgrading of informal settlements in their current location (in situ) or else a truly negotiated
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relocation. The case of the Joe Slovo community in the flats of
Cape Town, South Africa, is a prime example. A legal battle that
lasted several years succeeded in 2009 in staving off imminent
eviction.14 Subsequently, sustained engagement with the State
has only come about through the kind of community organizing measures used by SDI federations.15 For instance, early in
2010, the community completed an enumeration process, which
surveyed every household on a wide range of social indicators.16
This process of information gathering has assisted significantly
in organizing the community to be strong advocates for their
own priorities as they negotiate with the Cape Town metropolitan municipal government on how to upgrade the settlement in
situ.17 As a result of this engagement, a communal toilet block
plan is now in the construction phase and many more residents are set to be accommodated in formal housing than the
municipal government had initially planned.18 Elsewhere in
Cape Town, a citywide Informal Settlement Network (“ISN”) is
partnering with the metropolitan municipal government to pilot
similar people-led informal settlement upgrades in at least ten
settlements.19
A similar success story is unfolding in Nairobi, Kenya,
where the parastatal Kenya Railways Corporation has long
desired to evict many residents of the famous railway slums of
Kibera and Mukuru.20 The SDI-affiliated federation, Muungano
wa Wanavijiji (the Kenyan Homeless People’s Federation),
organized residents to count themselves in a massive household enumeration conducted around 2005.21 This enumeration
convinced the railway company to delay the eviction.22 Then,
SDI facilitated a learning exchange with an affiliate federation in Bombay, India, known as the National Slum Dwellers
Federation.23
The learning exchange illustrated the Indian federation’s
successful approach to facing down a similar threat a decade
earlier. In the 1990s, the Indian federation had enumerated tens
of thousands of railway line slum dwellers.24 This enumeration
served as a community-driven tool for negotiating with government about both the pace and scale of relocation, as well as in
planning for developments to accommodate those who would
be displaced.25 In Bombay, the community enumeration maps
show the astounding history in vivid detail: who remained, who
are waiting to enter permanent housing, and who are now living
in housing developments that were designed and partly built by
community members themselves.
After visiting the Bombay railway line through the SDIfacilitated learning exchange, the Kenya Railways Corporation
agreed that a new enumeration should take place in the affected
Nairobi communities and that it would serve as the basis for
similar plans for relocation and in situ upgrading.26 The new
enumeration was completed earlier in 2010.27 Now development
plans are in negotiation with community members firmly seated
at the negotiating table.28 This is an excellent example of the
“co-production” ethos. SDI federations are demonstrating variations on a theme: in the cities of the global South, there will be
“nothing for us, without us.”
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These methodologies are by no means exhaustive. SDI has
a specific set of tools to facilitate processes that mitigate evictions and upscale inclusive processes for city planning and basic
service delivery. Other organizations are also involved in supporting organized communities of the poor towards similar ends.
Community-led programs have fundamentally altered government policy and practice on human settlements in places like
Pakistan (Orangi Pilot Project)29 and Thailand (Community
Organizations Development Institute).30 These initiatives focus
on the co-management of finances and planning between organized communities and government institutions.

Conclusion
The challenge for civil society actors today is to support
urban poor communities not just in their struggles to fight evictions; support must also be forthcoming for poor communities’
efforts to build and redefine relationships with governments so
as to change the very institutions that have long made forced
evictions possible. This is a difficult task, fraught with potential
contradictions, unavoidable setbacks, and certain disappointments. But through these processes, the people who populate the
slums of cities like Nairobi and Bombay, Cape Town and Lagos,
Rio de Janeiro and Cairo will escape their all-too-frequent status
as victims. Governments and other formal actors make the poor
into victims when they forcibly eject them from their homes and
destroy their livelihoods. We all run the risk of victimizing the
poor if we forget that their solutions, their local expertise, and

their capacity for survival and ingenuity will form the foundation
of inclusive processes that realize human rights. It is their own
potential that civil society professionals must work to amplify
in order to change the troubling global picture for housing and
human settlements in our cities.
The time has come to consider how the rights-based agenda
has revealed its own limitations. It is time to consider how we
can continue to articulate the rights framework in a way that
maintains relevance to people’s struggles. As the “co-production” methodology gains increasing acceptability and scale, we
can think about socio-economic rights under a new rubric. There
is now scope for conceiving and protecting overarching guarantees, such as the rights to dignity and participation, which are at
the heart of “co-production.”
Organized communities of the poor are demonstrating that
socio-economic rights cannot be delivered without new understandings of the governance structures intended to guarantee
these rights. State and non-State professional actors are therefore tasked with opening up the space for poor people to influence and alter these institutions. This means translating informal
practice into formal language and bridging the gaps between
informal and formal technical expertise. As we come to terms
with our new urban age, we must grapple with the implications
of the routes we take to make change in the world. In order to
move beyond the limitations of socio-economic rights in theory,
we are now tasked with supporting the developmental methodologies of the poor that turn these into practice.
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